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BANKING

LAW:

"INTENT

TO

COURTS PLAY A LEGAL SHELL

INJURE

OR

DEFRAUD":

THE

GAME-United States v. Adam-

son, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983).
It is when the colors do not match, when the references in the index fail,
when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the
judge begins.
-Benjamin N. Cardozo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past, the federal criminal offense of willful misapplication of
bank funds, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 656,1 has been attacked for vagueness,2 handled inconsistently by the courts,3 and ineffectually reviewed
5
and redrafted by Congress. In United States v. Adamson, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc underscored this general confusion by reversing earlier decisions within the circuit6 and ruling con* B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21 (1971).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982). Section 656 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any capacity
with any Federal Reserve bank, member bank, national bank or insured bank, or a receiver
of a national bank, or any agent or employee of the receiver, or a Federal Reserve Agent,
or an agent or employee of a Federal Reserve Agent or of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of the
moneys, funds or credits of such bank or any moneys, funds, assets or securities intrusted
to the custody or care of such bank, or to the custody or care of any such agent, officer,
director, employee or receiver, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both; but if the amount embezzled, abstracted, purloined or misapplied
does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not more than S1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
2. The courts have held that "willfully misapplies" is not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g..
United States v. Cooper, 464 F.2d 648, 652-53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1972);
United States v. Fortunato, 402 F.2d 79, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
4. The present version of the misapplication statute is a recodification of 12 U.S.C. § 592
and was enacted by Congress in 1948 as part of a complete revision of the federal criminal code.
Recent sessions of Congress have continued to wrestle with revisions. See S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S.
1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
5. 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983).
6. That portion of United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979), which held that
disregard of the interest of a bank is, for [the] purpose of 'willful misapplication,'
a "....reckless
the equivalent of intent to injure or defraud,"' " was overruled by Adamson. Id. at 210 (quoting
United States v. Reynolds, 573 F.2d 242, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 1974))).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a later decision which followed Welliver, stated
that the defendants "had the requisite intent to violate section 656 since they acted, at minimum,
with reckless disregard for the interests of the bank." United States v. Salinas, 654 F.2d 319, 327
(5th Cir. 1981). Adamson also overruled this holding.
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trarily to the sounder logic of other circuits." Whether a subjective intent to injure or defraud the bank is necessary for conviction of willful
misapplication is the problematic issue in Adamson and at the heart of
the confusion concerning the statute.
The Fifth Circuit has defined the offense codified at section 656 as
a willful misapplication of bank funds with an intent to injure or defraud the bank.' Knowledge has been deemed the lowest possible
mental state to sustain a conviction under section 656. These determinations do not, however, resolve the problem in Adamson or with the
statute. It is the independent mental element within the judicially inserted clause "with intent to injure or defraud the bank" that has been
inconsistently handled by the courts and which requires specific definition. The Adamson court did not distinguish the duality of the mens
rea element and thus rendered a confused decision that offers little reasoned analysis of the required "intent to injure or defraud."
This casenote will review United States v. Adamson in juxtaposition to cases dealing with 18 U.S.C. § 656 in other circuits. The casenote will also attempt to discern the statute's meaning in terms consistent with the purposes of the congressional revision. By focusing
thought and attention on the clause "with intent to injure or defraud,"
a more uniform application of the statute may result.
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

The appellant, John R. Adamson III, was convicted of willful misapplication of bank funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656.1 Adamson,
president and lending officer of First Augusta State Bank, had authorized a loan to Island Summit Inc. At the trial, the jury found that
Island Summit was an inactive corporation and financially unable to
repay the loan.1" Also, the loan would have violated the bank's legal
aggregate and unsecured loan limits if it had been made directly to the
actual beneficiary. The loan was structured so as to make detection
difficult and to deceive the bank and bank examiners about the true
state of affairs with respect to the corporation's financial status."

7. See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
8. The clause "with intent to injure or defraud" in 12 U.S.C. § 592 was deleted in the 1948
revision of the statute. The courts have uniformly reinserted this element into the crime after the
revision by Congress. For supportive case law,.see the cases cited in Adamson, 700 F.2d at 956
n.5.
9. Adamson was also convicted of one count of making false entries in books, reports, and
statements of the bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1005, and of three counts of knowingly
making false statements to the bank for the purpose of influencing loan applications in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 1014. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 954.
10. Id. at 955.
11. Id.
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Adamson appealed his conviction, objecting to the jury instruction
that "[a] reckless disregard of the interest of the bank is the equivalent
of the intent to injure or defraud the bank."' 1 2 Additionally, the judge
gave jury instructions which indicated recklessness to be the requisite
mens rea of the offense. 13 These instructions were likewise objected to.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adamson determined that
"intent to injure or defraud" was an essential element of the crime.',
Therefore, jury instructions which equated reckless disregard for the
bank with a specific intent to injure or defraud the bank were given in
error.' 5 The circuit court reversed the lower court, overturning the earin United States v. Welliver 6 and United
lier Fifth Circuit 1reasoning
7
States v. Salinas.
As a result of Adamson, the Fifth Circuit has effectively placed a
renewed emphasis on the clause "with intent to injure or defraud" by
demanding a showing of specific intent. Analysis of the reasoning behind the Adamson opinion, the reasoning of other circuits, and the language and purpose of section 656 suggest that this emphasis may in
fact be improper.

III.

ANALYSIS

After the Fifth Circuit determined knowledge to be the minimal
mens rea for conviction under section 656, their conclusions in Adamson rested on two unequivocal principles. The substitution of a lower
mens rea for that which is required by statute is violative of criminal
rules of procedure. It is equally improper to presume the requisite mens
rea by judicial inference. The court relied on the doctrine laid down in
Sandstrom v. Montana:'8 when purpose or knowledge is an element of
the criminal charge, instructing the jury that the "law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" im-

12. Id. The defendant also appealed his conviction under § 1005 on the grounds that the
improper jury charge under § 656 tainted the charge under § 1005. This assignment of error was
found to be without merit. Id.
13. The trial judge instructed that the defendant's "'conduct must amount to reckless disregard of the bank's interests or outright abstraction of funds. . . .The word "willful" is also
employed to characterize . . . conduct marked by a reckless disregard...... Quoted in id. at
966.
14. Id. at 956 n.5.
15. Id. at 967.
16. Id. at 965. In overruling Welliver, 601 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979), the court stated,
"[W]e erred when we held in Welliver that a jury is properly charged that recklessness is the
equivalent of intent to injure or defraud." Adamson, 700 F.2d at 963. See supra note 6.
17. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 965 n.18. Salinas, 654 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981), was overruled
to the extent that it followed Welliver. See supra note 6.
18. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
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properly removes the choice of inference from the jury.' 9 With these
premises well-established, the court concluded that the contested jury
instructions which equated reckless disregard with the required higher
standard of knowledge mandated a reversal of the appellant's
conviction.
A.

Inconsistent Treatment among the Circuits

The court's reading of the language and precedent of section 656
is flawed. As previously noted, the tedious analysis of the majority did
not confront the duality of the scienter requirement and the disagreement which has arisen out of the courts' efforts to interpret the statute.
A specific intent to misapply funds is distinct from a specific intent to
injure or defraud the bank.
After surveying other decisions, the majority determined that "the
cases from other circuits [reveal] a uniform rule that the appropriate
mens rea standard for § 656 is knowledge."20 The First Circuit had
based conviction upon a "knowing participation in a deceptive arrangezment." 2 The Second Circuit had affirmed a conviction after the trial
judge instructed the jury "'that misapplication occurs when an officer
of a bank knowingly lends money to a fictitious borrower or causes the
loan to be made to his own benefit, concealing his interest from the
bank.' "22 Seventh Circuit decisions had approved instructions which
required a showing of specific intent: the government must prove "'that
the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids purposely
intending to violate the law.' ,23 Finally, the Ninth Circuit had approved an indictment which alleged that the " 'defendant "with intent
to defraud or injure" the bank "did wilfully and knowingly misapply or
caused to be misapplied monies" of the bank in that said defendant did
cause a specified loan to be made by the bank to a specified individual
"knowing that [such individual] was not the actual beneficiary of the
loan." ' "24
Whereas the circuits are in agreement that there must exist a
knowing participation in the misapplication, there is no consensus as to
the reading of the clause "with intent to injure or defraud." Many circuits do, in fact, equate reckless disregard for the bank with an intent

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 517.
Adamson, 700 F.2d at 962.
Id. at 958 (discussing United States v. Gens, 493 F.2d 216 (Ist Cir. 1974)).
Adamson, 700 F.2d at 958 (quoting Fortunato,402 F.2d at 81).
Adamson, 700 F.2d at 960 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 31, 34 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
24. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 961 (quoting United States v. Beattie, 594 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
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to injure or defraud it.25 Other circuits demand only that the act of
misapplication be committed voluntarily, with knowledge that the act is
prohibited by law. Intent to injure or defraud the bank is disregarded."6
A third group of courts treats the clause with the actus reus and recognizes culpability when the natural tendency of the act may be to injure
or defraud the bank.27 For these courts it is unnecessary to support a
further mens rea element. Intent is presumed by law from the act of
misapplication.28
Although the clause has been inconsistently handled, the approaches are not so inconsistent with Sandstrom v. Montana2 9 as the
Adamson court might suggest.3 0 The gravamen of willful misapplication is that bank money has "been used for a purpose that the bank
would not have agreed to had it known what the purpose was." ' Such
a transaction must be purposeful--coming not merely as a result of
maladministration, neglect of bank responsibility, or a breach of
trust. 2 This constitutes the completed crime of willful misapplication.
The clause "with intent to injure or defraud" is absent from the statute; it was deleted from the preceding misapplication provision when
Congress drafted the 1948 revision. However, Congress then instructed
that "[tihe revised section without changing in any way the meaning or

25. United States v. Cyr, 712 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Franklin, 608 F.2d
241 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1978) (reckless disregard is sufficient to establish an intent to defraud); United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010,
1024 (3d Cir.) (reckless disregard is equivalent to an intent to injure), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964
(1978).
26. The judge need not instruct that intent to injure is an element of the crime, it being
sufficient to charge the jury to ensure that those convicted were conscious of their wrongdoing.
United States v. Scheper, 520 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Hansen,
701 F.2d 1215, 1218 (7th Cit. 1982) (court found no error in refusing to instruct the jury that
').
'[i]ntent to injure or deceive is an essential element of the offense of misapplication ....
"Whether appellants intended to defraud or injure First National is, of course, immaterial in
an 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 prosecution." United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 701 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
27. United States v. Franklin, 608 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Krepps,
605 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cit. 1979); Golden v. United States, 318 F.2d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1963);
Galbreath v. United States, 257 F. 648, 656 (6th Cit. 1918).
28. "[The] evidence is said to indicate Weil and appellant did not intend to injure or de[Regardless of this fact], '[t]he offense occurred and was complete when the
fraud the bank ....
misapplication took place.'" United States v. Tokoph, 514 F.2d 597, 604 (10th Cit. 1975) (quoting United States v. Acree, 466 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973)).
29. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
30. The jury instructions in Adamson may have been interpreted as replacing the specific
intent to misapply funds with a reckless disregard for the interest of the bank. As such, the instructions would be clearly out of line with Sandstrom. The majority, however, concluded more
specifically that "jury instructions [should] not equate recklessness with intent to injure or defraud
." 700 F.2d at 965.
31. United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 266 (7th Cir. 1983).
32. United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 193, 199 (1883).
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substance of existing law, clarifies, condenses, and combines" the word-

ing in the earlier draft of the act."3 Because of this instruction, the
congressional revision has been treated by the majority of courts as
poor drafting and the clause has been judicially reinserted. 4 The
clause, however, might be logically dismissed as a needless complement

to the term "willfully misapplies." '5 Justice Learned Hand noted prior
to the congressional revision that the words "with intent to injure or
defraud the bank" may perhaps be unnecessary if read in connection
with the words "wilful misapplication."3 The knowledge of the misapplication may not be replaced with a lesser standard of recklessness or
satisfied by judicial inference, but the judicially inserted clause may be
given as little or as much weight as the court deems proper.

In many circuits, courts routinely allow "reckless disregard" to replace a showing of specific "intent" to injure or defraud the bank.3
Emphasis is properly placed on the "willfulness" of the misapplication,
and it is this mens rea which is not compromised. Further evidence
needed to support a finding of "intent to defraud [after showing a willful misapplication] is minimal .

*."..s"
A reckless

disregard for the

interests of the bank will suffice to support a conviction. As noted by
the majority in Adamson, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Larson, 9 as interpreted by United States v. McAnally,' 0 equated reckless-

ness with intent to injure or defraud.4 The Adamson majority cited
both cases approvingly because the Seventh Circuit ultimately required
a mens rea of knowledge or purpose in defining "willfully misap-

33. 18 U.S.C. § 656 Historical and Revision Notes (1982).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Docherty, 468 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1972); Williamson v.
United States, 332 F.2d 123, 134 n.16 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Hernandez v. United States, 608
F.2d 1361, 1364 (10th Cir. 1979); Ramirez v. United States, 318 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir.
1963).
35. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted the district court's rationale that
Congress, in omitting "intent to injure or defraud" in the 1948 revision, undoubtedly considered
those words to be redundant. Logsdon v. United States, 253 F.2d 12, 14 (6th Cir. 1958). See also
United States v. Twifford, 600 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1979); Riebold, 557 F.2d at 701.
36. United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
37. See supra note 25.
38. Hansen, 701 F.2d at 1218. Through circumstantial evidence, fictitious names, improper
paperwork, and secrecy in money transfers, courts have repeatedly found purposeful misapplication. Fortunato,402 F.2d at 80-81. "[ljntent is not measured by a psychic reading of [the] mind
but by the surrounding facts and circumstances; i.e., circumstantial evidence. It takes only common sense and good conscience under the facts recited above to reach a permissible inference that
Larson deliberately misapplied the Elkhorn Bank's funds .
L...
Larson, 581 F.2d at 667. Intent
to injureor defraud requires no additional evidentiary proof.
39. 581 F.2d at 667.
40. 666 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1981).
41. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 960.
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plies"-"a term that in itself connotes criminal wrongdoing." 42 This
same reasoning could have been employed to sustain the lower court in
Adamson. As the dissent pointed out, the instruction taken as a whole
"properly conveyed to the jury the level of knowing, willful conduct
required." 4 The instruction of reckless disregard was directed at sustaining the required intent to injure or defraud-not at replacing the
specific intent of the misapplication.
In a literal reading of the statute, some courts have read the clause
out of the offense. The First Circuit in United States v. Hansen" removed the mental element from the clause. The court here affirmed a
conviction where the trial judge had instructed that the crime was complete if " 'the [defendant] acts knowingly and if the natural result of
his conduct would be to injure and defraud the bank . . . . "' An
instruction that intent to injure or defraud is an essential element of
the offense was refused by the Hansen court and affirmed on appeal."
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has refused to construe the crime as involving a subjective intent to injure or defraud the bank.' 7 "Whether
appellants intended to defraud or injure . . . is, of course, immaterial
in an 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 prosecution." 4
Far more often, courts maintain that the subjective intent to injure
or defraud is an essential element of the crime, but the requisite intent
is presumed from the act itself. A violation may occur when the misapplication is made in honest belief that the bank will benefit;" the
probability that the loan will be repaid is not legally significant.5 0
Courts which continue to require a showing of specific intent to
injure, but then presume the requisite intent from the misapplication,
confront inconsistencies in sustaining convictions. Often quoted by
these courts in response to an appellant's defense of "good faith" is the
language of the Sixth Circuit: "An intent to injure or defraud . . .is
not inconsistent with a desire for the ultimate success and welfare of

42. McAnally, 666 F.2d at 1120.
43. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 969 (Roney & Fay, JJ., dissenting).
44. 701 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1983).
45. Quoted in id. at 1218.
46. Id.
47. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697.
48. Id. at 701.
49. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 583 (1st Cir.) (the improper loan was made to
assist the trust company), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1935); Galbreath. 257 F. at 656 (defendant
undisputably desired ultimate success for the bank); United States v. Harper, 33 F. 471, 492
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1887) (not relevant were the defendant's claims that he was making "desperate
attempts to save the bank").
50. Benchwick v. United States, 297 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant intended for
the improper use to be temporary and to ultimately have no effect on the bank). See also Tokoph,
514 F.2d at 604; Fortunato, 402 F.2d at 80-81.
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the bank."' 51 This explanation serves to highlight the inconsistency. Following this reasoning, the Sixth Circuit later affirmed a conviction for
willful misapplication and refused to negate the presumed intent when
evidence showed that the "loans were good loans, at the time they were
made."52 The defendant argued unsuccessfully that this evidence was
relevant to whether he acted with specific intent to injure or defraud
the bank.5'
Courts have refused to allow guaranties to repay improper loans,"
payments on improper loans," or evidence of desired bank profit 5" to
invalidate the presumption of intent to injure or defraud. Whereas the
majority of courts exclude such evidence, the Eighth Circuit realized
the problem:' 7 "In a prosecution for willful misapplication of bank
funds the question of intent is of supreme importance, and testimony
bearing on the issue of the defendant's good faith should not be
excluded."' 8
By literally construing the language of the statute, the inconsistencies will be resolved. Willful misapplication is not always inconsistent
with a desire for the ultimate success of the bank; but an intent to
injure presumed from the misapplication itself is clearly inconsistent
with desired bank success, and thereby at odds with the truth in the
case of the good-faith defendant. Because of this inaccurate presumption, the courts should acknowledge the congressional revision and
eliminate the specific intent to injure or defraud.
B.

The Statutory Goal: Prevention of Insider Misconduct

The majority in Adamson relied heavily" on United States v.
Gens" and United States v. Docherty.61 In Gens and Docherty, empha51. Galbreath, 257 F. at 656. See also Golden, 318 F.2d at 361; Mulloney, 79 F.2d at 584.
52. United States v. Foster, 566 F.2d 1045, 1053 (6th Cir. 1977) (misapplication involved
loans made to solvent borrowers who agreed to repay them), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917 (1978).
53. Id.

54. Id. at 1050.
55. Fortunato,402 F.2d at 81 (Fortunato had been making payments and, in fact, made the
final payment after being dismissed by the bank).
56. As clearly indicated in misapplication-bribery cases, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 544
F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976), the fact that the bank may ultimately benefit from an illegal act knowingly performed does not negate the requisite intent to injure or defraud. See also United States v.
Beran, 546 F.2d 1316, 1321 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977); United States v.
Giodano, 489 F.2d 327, 333 (2d Cir. 1973); Acree, 466 F.2d at 1117.
57. United States v. Steffen, 641 F.2d 591 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943 (1981).

58. Id. at 596. The testimony of good faith was here a defense to the charge of willfulness.
It is probable that the court would have disregarded such testimony as regards the officer's intent
to injure or defraud the bank. If the intent to injure is regarded as an essential element of the
offense, the different handling of good-faith testimony is not supportable.
59. Adamson, 700 F.2d at 958-59.
60. 493 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1974).
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sis was placed on the bank employee's subjective intent to injure or
defraud. In Gens, the director of the bank had received the maximum
amount receivable through bank loans issued in his own name. 2 In an
effort to finance a nursing-home business, he filed loans through a number of friends and retained the proceeds as the actual beneficiary.68 The
First Circuit focused on the result of the misapplication, considered the
likelihood of repayment, and prohibited a presumption of intent to injure or defraud.64 Similarly, in Docherty the Second Circuit reversed
the conviction of the named recipient of a loan which actually went to
the bank officer." The court refused to presume intent to injure or defraud since no financial damage to the bank was proven or
foreseeable.66
Like Adamson, these cases breathe life into the clause which Congress has deleted and courts have stumbled on. The Gens ruling effectively allows a bank officer to obtain funds in excess of the bank's limits
by subterfuge. The machinations of Gens enabled him to circumvent
statutes prohibiting loans to bank insiders.67 In fact, there are no other
available sanctions to discourage this type of activity." Judge Lumbard's dissent in Docherty illustrates the intolerable results from consistently applying the majority's interpretation of the statute:
By the majority's reasoning no violation of § 656 would occur when a
bank officer decided to borrow bank money under an assumed name to
finance stock speculations and other ventures, if he had every intention
at the time to repay the bank from a relatively secure source of future
funds . . .even if he later was unable to pay. Such a result would be
unacceptable. 9

"[The] statute was enacted to preserve the FDIC from loss and to
preserve and protect the assets of banks having a federal relationship."70° To realize this goal, Congress used the operative language
"embezzlement, abstractions, purloining and willful misapplication" as
a means of covering the full range of proscribed conduct by bank offi-

61. 468 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1972).
62. Gens, 493 F.2d at 219.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 223.
65. Docherty 468 F.2d at 993.
66. Id.
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 375(a) (1982). This statute, which limits the amount of money that
officers and directors may borrow from their own bank, is written in terms of direct loans.
68. See generally M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 310-12 (1974).
69. Docherty, 468 F.2d at 996-97 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
70. United States v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 715, 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921
(1979).
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cials. 71 By imparting new life to the clause "with intent to injure or

defraud the bank," the courts limit the statute's efficacy.
Responsive to the wording and goal of the statute is the Ninth

Circuit. The crime is there complete when the defendant willfully deprives the bank of "its right to have custody of its funds, that is, the
right to make its own decisions as to how the funds are used." ' 72 In an
early Ninth Circuit interpretation of section 656, the following jury instruction was approved:
"The money admittedly was for his use; why didn't he borrow the money
from the bank and give his own note for it? If now, in illustrating the
case given you a moment ago, if he could not have gotten that money out
of his own bank, then the method used would be a misapplication of
funds even though the Brown note was fully secured, because it would be
taking the money when the right to take it did not exist."173

By interpreting willful misapplication broadly, sanctioning deliberate and knowingly wrongful acts, and deleting the phrase "with intent
to injure or defraud," three benefits will result. First, this reading
would permit a definition of the crime free of the vagaries of inferences
and the inconsistent treatments of the mens rea.7 4 Second, such an interpretation would reflect the intent of the statute's authors to place the

bank insiders under heightened scrutiny and impose upon them an obligation to exercise a high degree of care-ultimately protecting the in-

tegrity of the FDIC.75 Third, by resting convictions solely upon the
term "willful" and requiring specific intent, many of the tenuous presumptions and inferences would be avoided. There would then be less

risk of imposing criminal sanctions upon a defendant who did not act
with criminal intent.7

71. See generally Morse, Bank Insiders and the Willful Misapplication Statute: Toward
More Effective Protection from Self-Dealing, 92 BANKING L.J. 715, 736-37 (1975).
72. United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
921 (1979).
73. Krepps, 605 F.2d at 108 (quoting Hargreaves v.United States, 75 F.2d 68, 71-72 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 759 (1935)).
74. Except for the handling of the clause, the statute receives uniform treatment. To reach
consistent outcomes in successive cases, the required intent to injure or defraud is manipulated
with inferences, presumptions, and loose language regarding the sufficiency of a mens rea level
less than knowledge. See Adamson, 700 F.2d at 962-64 (discussing the evolution of the rule in the
Wilson-Reynolds- Welliver line of cases).
75. 2 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 921 (Tent.
Draft 1969) (National Commission voiced concern for controlling the insider's handling of bank
funds).
76. As a result of confused statutory interpretation, courts may erroneously allow the mens
rea of recklessness or conclusive presumptions to supplant the appropriate specific intent to misapply funds. The term "willful" cannot be compromised without causing an injustice. Adamson
wrongly compromised the mens rea of the crime and thus the specific handling of "intent to injure
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CASENOTES

1984]
IV.

CONCLUSION

In a curious reading of the federal bank-fund misapplication statute, the Adamson court overturned a line of reasoning in the Fifth Circuit which had de-emphasized the significance of the phrase "with intent to injure or defraud." By demanding a specific intent to injure or
defraud, the court ruled counter to a trend evidenced in the other circuits. The decision, however, should cause ,no new legal problems. Because of the ready availability of inferences and presumptions, decisions on a case-by-case basis will continue to sustain convictions under
a broad application of the statute. Patience awaits the day when the
Fifth Circuit will avoid the past inconsistencies and flawed rationalizations and enunciate a clear and honest understanding of 18 U.S.C. §
656. Only with an opinion unfettered by the past confusion can the
precedential morass be left behind and this area of the law be settled
without case-by-case affirmances.
John A. Smalley

or defraud" may have been dicta. In the later circuit case, United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1983), the court relied on Adamson to find knowledge to be the requisite mens rea. But,
as for the clause "with intent to injure," the court noted, "It exists if the natural result of his
conduct is or may be to injure the bank; there is no requirement that the accused desire the
injury." Id.'at 1355.
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